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We argue that the policy uncertainty generated by elections encourages private actors to delay 
investments that entail high costs of reversal, creating pre-election declines in the associated 
sectors. Moreover, this incentive depends on the competitiveness of the race and the policy 
differences between the major parties/candidates. Using new survey and housing market data 
from the United States, we test these arguments. The survey analysis assesses whether 
respondents’ perceptions of presidential candidates’ policy differences increased the 
respondents’ likelihood of delaying certain purchases and actions. The housing market analysis 
examines whether elections are associated with a pre-election decline in economic activity, and 
whether any such decline depends on electoral competitiveness. The results support the 
predictions and cannot be explained by existing theories.  
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jee.park.wws@gmail.com.  How do elections affect the economy? Most work on this question examines 
whether elections alter the economic policies of incumbent governments. In particular, 
theories of “opportunistic” political business cycles suggest that policymakers induce 
short-term economic expansions immediately before elections with the expectation that 
the gains will subside soon after the votes have been cast.
1 A separate line of work argues 
that left-wing governments pursue low unemployment at the expense of higher inflation 
while right-wing governments prioritize low inflation at the expense of higher 
unemployment. In the rational partisan theory, for instance, these partisan priorities and 
uncertainty about the electoral outcome cause a post-election increase (decrease) in 
unemployment if the left- (right-) wing party wins.
2  
  We argue that a major and underappreciated impact of elections is that they 
generate policy uncertainty that encourages individuals and businesses to delay certain 
types of investments until the race concludes. These investments are ones that would be 
                                                            
1 For reviews see James E. Alt and Alec K. Chrystal, Political Economy (Berkeley: Berkeley 
University Press, 1983); Allan Drazen, ‘The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years’, in Ben S. 
Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, eds, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 15 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 75-138; Robert J. Franzese, ‘Electoral and Partisan Cycles 
in Economic Policies and Outcomes’, Annual Review of Political Science, 5 (2002), 369-421; 
William R. Keech, Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
2 Alberto Alesina, John Londregan, and Howard Rosenthal, ‘A Model of the Political Economy 
of the United States’, American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 12-33.  
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impossible or costly to reverse; scholars have termed them “irreversible investments.”
3 
Examples include housing or automobiles for individuals and fixed capital for businesses. 
In the sectors associated with such investments, the incentive for delay causes a pre-
election decline. Moreover, because the incentive derives from the policy uncertainty 
associated with the election, the decline is larger the greater are the policy differences 
between the major parties/candidates and the more competitive is the race.   
  We test the arguments about irreversible investment, elections, and uncertainty 
with survey and behavioral data that involve a canonical irreversible investment, housing.  
We collected the survey data in conjunction with the 2008 Cooperative Congressional 
Election Survey (hereinafter CCES), which involved pre- and post-election waves in 
association with the 2008 United States elections.
4 This survey analysis compares a 
respondent’s pre-election perceptions of how much the presidential election outcome will 
affect his or her financial situation with post-election accounts of whether he or she 
delayed housing-related activities and purchases until learning the outcome. Notably, 
only some of these activities are irreversible investments, and therefore the theoretical 
arguments do not always predict a significant relationship. The survey analysis can 
                                                            
3 E.g., Ben S. Bernanke, ‘Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 98 (1983), 85-106. 
4 Stephen Ansolabehere, ‘Guide to the 2008 Congressional Cooperative Election Study’ (Harvard 
University Typescript, 2009), available at 
http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/data?dvn_subpage=/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hd
l:1902.1/14003 (accessed December 14, 2011).  
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therefore repudiate the theory by finding an effect when one is not predicted as well as by 
failing to find an effect when one is predicted. 
  The second type of test involves data on US housing markets.  More specifically, 
we make use of the staggering of US gubernatorial elections across time and states to 
analyze whether the variation in gubernatorial electoral cycles is associated with variation 
in state and local housing markets. Because the theoretical arguments apply most directly 
to the quantity of sales, we begin with an analysis of this factor using Zillow.com data 
from thirty-five states from 1999-2006. We proceed to discuss conditions under which 
the arguments apply to home prices and examine price data from over three hundred 
metropolitan statistical areas from 1979-2006.  
  The paper begins by reviewing research on irreversible investment. The second 
section develops the theoretical argument and compares it to other perspectives. The third 
section describes the survey analysis, and the fourth section the examination of housing 
markets. We conclude by discussing the implications of the analysis for understanding 
the impact of elections on the economy.  
Research on Irreversible Investment  
  Various formal models analyze the incentive to delay irreversible investments 
when economic uncertainty is high.
5 The original models focused on business decisions, 
and show that delay can be optimal even for a risk neutral firm that incurs costs from 
postponing the investment. The firm’s incentives depend on how soon the new 
                                                            
5 E.g., Bernanke, ‘Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment’; Alex Cukierman, ‘The 
Effects of Uncertainty on Investment under Risk Neutrality with Endogenous Information’, 
Journal of Political Economy, 88 (1980), 462-475.   
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information will be revealed, the value of the information, the costs of delay, and the cost 
of undoing the investment (if undoing it is even possible). Subsequent scholarship 
applied the theories to consumer behavior and established that economic uncertainty can 
induce individuals to postpone costly-to-undo investments including homes and 
consumer durables.
6 Housing is a archetypal irreversible investment given the high 
transaction costs associated with undoing the purchase of the home; as Christopher 
Carroll and Wendy Dunn contend, housing is the “mother of all durable goods.”
7 
Furthermore, households commonly devote a significant portion of their savings to this 
asset.
8  
  Some studies have conjectured that political events are an important source of 
economic uncertainty, but this possibility has more typically “been discussed casually” 
                                                            
6 E.g., Christopher D. Carroll and Wendy E. Dunn, ‘Unemployment Expectations, Jumping (S,s) 
Triggers, and Household Balance Sheets’, in Ben S. Bernanke and Julio J. Rotemberg, eds, NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, 12 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 165-230; John Hassler, 
‘Uncertainty and the Timing of Automobile Purchases’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 103 
(2001), 351-66; Christina D. Romer, ‘The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (1990), 597-624.  
7 Carroll and Dunn, ‘Unemployment Expectations, Jumping (S,s) Triggers, and Household 
Balance Sheets’, p. 179. 
8 Ben Ansell suggests that homes are such a large part of individuals’ assets that one’s home 
value influences preferences about social insurance policies. Ben W. Ansell, ‘Bubbling Under: 
Political Preferences during Asset Bubbles’ (University of Minnesota Typescript, 2008).  
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rather than scrutinized, to quote George Bittlingmayer.
9 Bittlingmayer himself offers 
evidence within the context a major historical shift; in particular, he demonstrates that the 
switch from Imperial to Weimar Germany induced stock market volatility and output 
declines.
10 Likewise, Nicholas Bloom shows that major wars and acts of terrorism can 
induce stock market volatility.
11 However, even Bittlingmayer and Bloom do not offer 
evidence that more routine political events, let alone elections, affect irreversible 
investment because of the associated political uncertainty. 
Theoretical Framework 
Because others have already developed formal theories of irreversible investment 
and applied them to the housing industry, we do not take up space constructing a full 
formalization. Instead, we begin by justifying the argument that elections are a key 
source of uncertainty and then delineate how the uncertainty affects individuals’ and 
firms’ incentives. We proceed to argue that this impact depends on the policy differences 
between the major parties/candidates and electoral competitiveness. 
Elections and Uncertainty 
Elections are an important source of economic uncertainty due to the fact that the 
outcome of a race affects subsequent government decisions.  As Andrea Mattozzi 
summarizes, “Political uncertainty…arises because different candidates running for 
                                                            
9 George Bittlingmayer, ‘Output, Stock Volatility, and Political Uncertainty in a Natural 
Experiment: Germany, 1880-1940’, Journal of Finance, 53 (1998), 2243-57, at p. 2245. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Nicholas Bloom, ‘The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks’, Econometrica, 77 (2009), 623-685.     
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office, if elected, will implement different policies…”
12 These differences encompass 
fiscal as well as regulatory policies. Moreover, the policies may be targeted to a specific 
industry or instead designed to affect society more broadly. 
Consider fiscal policy. A range of work suggests that conservative parties prefer 
lower spending on domestic programs and lower taxes than progressive parties do; this 
generalization has received support in a variety of countries including the US, where the 
difference holds at the national and state-levels.
13 In other words, for individuals as well 
as firms, the outcome of an election may affect their income and/or tax rates. For an 
individual, such an effect might occur if his or her taxes were likely to change under a 
new government; if his or her job were associated with government employment, 
government contracting, or an industry closely associated with public programs; or if his 
income depended on government benefits that the left- or right-wing party would likely 
alter. As these examples suggest, the uncertainty will not be identical across society but 
instead vary according to the likely effects of the candidates’/parties’ policies.  
Indeed, some types of fiscal policies are even targeted to particular investments or 
industries. For instance, the Obama administration has proposed reducing the mortgage-
interest tax deduction for high-income households. This policy, if enacted, would 
                                                            
12 Andrea Mattozzi, ‘Can We Insure Against Political Uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. Stock 
Market’, Public Choice, 137 (2008), 43-55, at p. 43. 
13 E.g., James E. Alt and Robert C. Lowry, ‘Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget 
Deficits: Evidence from the States’, American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 811-28; 
David W. Brady and Craig Volden, Revolving Gridlock, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2005); Thomas R. Cusack, ‘Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in 
the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989’, Public Choice, 91 (1997), 375-395.   
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effectively increase the cost of home mortgages to these households.
14 At the US state-
level, some governments have limited the ability of localities to raise property taxes and 
provided property tax relief to certain classes of homeowners.
15   
Parties differ over not only fiscal policies but also regulatory policies that favor 
different mixes of industries. For example, environmental regulations that support 
alternative energy sources may increase the profitability of these businesses as well as the 
desirability of cars or homes that make use of such energy sources.
16 With respect to 
housing, industry- or firm-specific regulations can also influence the value of homes that 
are located near a firm affected by the regulations. Moreover, research suggests that 
homeowners are aware of these effects. For instance, Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. 
                                                            
14 Walter Alarkon, ‘Ax May Fall on Tax Break for Mortgages’, The Hill, 8 June 2010.  
15 See, e.g., Elizabeth Albanese, ‘Texas’ Perry Signs School Finance Bill that Cuts Maximum 
Property Tax Rate’, Bond Buyer, 6 June 2006, p. 4; ‘Governor Rendell:  Record 588,638 
Pennsylvanians Received Property Tax/Rent Rebates’, PR Newswire, 16 February 2010.  
16 Numerous studies suggest that industries favored by a particular party perform better in the 
stock market as that party’s probability of winning increases. For evidence at the presidential 
level, see Michael C. Herron, James Lavin, Donald Cram, and Jay Silver, ‘Measurement of 
Political Effects in the United States Economy: A Study of the 1992 Presidential Election’, 
Economics & Politics, 11 (1999), 51-81; Mattozzi, ‘Can We Insure against Political Uncertainty? 
Evidence from the U.S. Stock Market’. For evidence at the state-level, see Michael R. Butler and 
Edward M. McNertney, ‘Election Returns as a Signal of Changing Regulatory Climate’, Energy 
Economics, 13 (1991), 48-54.  
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Slaughter find that individuals care about the effects of trade policies on local firms due 
to the ensuing effects on local home prices.
17  
Finally, for some individuals, elections create economic uncertainty by affecting 
the behavior of the individuals’ employers. Research on the timing of contract 
negotiations suggests that firms tend to delay these negotiations until after elections, and 
this research relates the delay to the policy uncertainty created by elections.
18 
Accordingly, workers who are aware that their contract will be reviewed after an election 
may associate it with economic uncertainty even if the workers are not following the race 
closely. The policy uncertainty associated with elections thus engenders economic 
uncertainty for individuals and firms through a variety of mechanisms.  
Incentives for Irreversible Investment 
Because elections induce uncertainty, individuals and firms can have the incentive 
to delay costly-to-undo investments until after electoral outcomes are realized. Consider a 
given individual or firm X that is interested in making an irreversible investment i, and 
assume the outcome of the election affects the type or level of investment that is optimal. 
The investment is irreversible; for simplicity, assume it cannot be undone. (Alternatively, 
one could assume it can only be undone at high costs and incorporate how these costs 
affect X’s incentives.) If X delays the investment until after the election, X chooses the 
optimal investment i*. Delaying the investment postpones the utility and/or profits that X 
                                                            
17 Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, ‘What Determines Individual Trade-Policy 
Preferences?’, Journal of International Economics, 54 (2001), 267-92.  
18 Michelle R. Garfinkel and Amihai Glazer, ‘Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic 
Fluctuations?’ American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the 106
th Annual Meeting 
of the American Economic Association, 84 (1994), 169-73.  
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receives from the investment, however, and therefore carries a cost c. If X commits to an 
investment before the election, then X avoids the cost c but risks choosing an investment 
that is not first-best given the information that is subsequently revealed. The question for 
X is thus whether the expected utility from i* versus that from the investment that X 
would make before the election outweighs the cost of delay c.
19 
In the previous sub-section, we provided a good deal of justification for the claim 
that elections create policy uncertainty. Given this effect, it seems reasonable to expect 
that the benefits of waiting will commonly outweigh the costs associated with doing so. If 
this expectation is correct, then on average elections will be associated with a pre-election 
decline in irreversible investment. That is, if we examine all elections taken together as a 
group, we should expect to observe a pre-election decline. We will refer to this prediction 
as the Pre-election Decline Prediction.  
Policy Differences and Irreversible Investment 
  The discussion thus far has emphasized that the incentive for delaying costly-to-
undo investments derives from the policy differences between the major 
parties/candidates. Yet of course, elections are not identical in terms of the policy 
differences between the parties. In some cases, the parties’ positions might be relatively 
similar while in other cases, the parties might propose drastically different approaches to 
economic issues. Likewise, even within a given election, the policy differences that exist 
                                                            
19 This decision-theoretic framework follows that in Cukierman, ‘The Effects of Uncertainty on 
Investment under Risk Neutrality with Endogenous Information’.  Formal analysis by Avinash 
Dixit and Robert Pindyck incorporates competition among firms. See Avinash K. Dixit and 
Robert S. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).  
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between the parties will not affect all individuals similarly. For instance, one party could 
propose to freeze the pay of federal workers, and such a policy would clearly affect 
public employees more than private ones.  Similarly, the Obama administration proposal 
to reduce the mortgage deduction for higher-income individuals should affect these 
individuals more than others. 
  This variation across elections and individuals suggests that the effect of elections 
on irreversible investment will depend on the policy differences between the major 
competitors. In particular, as the polarization between the major parties/candidates 
increase, the incentive to delay irreversible investment until after the election will also 
increase.  We refer to this prediction as the Policy Differences Prediction.  It suggests that 
the larger are the effects that an electoral outcome will have on an individual’s financial 
situation, the more likely she should be to delay costly-to-undo investments. Likewise, 
the hypothesis implies that as the policy differences between parties/candidates increase, 
sectors associated with irreversible investment should experience a larger downturn.   
Electoral Competitiveness and Irreversible Investment 
Elections not only vary in terms of the policy differences between the major 
parties/candidates but also with respect to the competitiveness of the race.  In some 
elections, a party/candidate holds a convincing lead throughout the campaign, while in 
other cases the race is highly competitive. As competitiveness increases, individuals and 
firms will be less able to predict the types of policies that the government will support 
after the election and consequently, the benefits from delaying costly-to-reverse 
investments increases. We therefore expect the decline in irreversible investment to be 
larger the more competitive is the race. We call this prediction the Electoral 
Competitiveness Prediction.   
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Notably, if the outcome is highly predictable, then the election may engender so 
little policy uncertainty that the benefits from postponing irreversible investments may be 
trivial. In that case, individuals and firms are unlikely to want to bear the costs associated 
with delay. The Electoral Competitiveness Prediction does not specify a threshold beyond 
which an election is insufficiently competitive to generate a pre-election decline in 
irreversible investment, but allows for this possibility. The empirical analysis will assess 
whether such a threshold exists.  
Comparison with other Theoretical Perspectives  
  The above-developed theoretical predictions and framework, which we will refer 
to as the Electoral Investment theory, contrast with other perspectives of how elections 
influence the economy. It is worth highlighting the differences with three major 
alternatives: opportunistic political business cycle theories, partisan business cycle 
theories, and recent work on how mass partisanship influences consumer behavior. 
Consider the opportunistic perspective, where incumbents engineer a pre-election 
expansion through fiscal and/or monetary policies.
20 Some scholarship suggests that the 
cycle will not occur if an incumbent is highly popular, and therefore quite likely to win 
reelection,
 21 or highly unpopular.
22 Other work indicates that the cycle is larger in 
                                                            
20 E.g., William Nordhaus, ‘The Political Business Cycle’, Review of Economic Studies, 42 
(1975), 169-90; Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and 
Politics (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990); Kenneth Rogoff, 
‘Equilibrium Political Business Cycles’, American Economic Review, 80 (1990), 21-36. 
21 Kenneth A. Schultz, ‘The Politics of the Political Business Cycle’, British Journal of Political 
Science, 25 (1995), 79-99.  
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countries with higher levels of polarization.
23 Thus in contrast to the predictions of the 
Electoral Investment theory, the opportunistic perspective suggests that the pre-election 
period is associated with an expansion that increases with electoral competitiveness and 
elite polarization.  
Partisan theories assume that growth and employment is lower under right-wing 
governments. In the traditional partisan cycle of Douglas Hibbs, this lower growth does 
not depend on the electoral cycle.
24 In the rational partisan theory of Alberto Alesina, 
John Londregan, and Howard Rosenthal, growth varies across the term but there is no 
pre-election contraction. As they note, in the latter half of a term, “the economy returns to 
its ‘normal’ rate of growth, implying that there is not a ‘partisan’ influence on the rate of 
growth in the second half of each term.”
25 This rate is normal regardless of the level of 
electoral competitiveness or polarization between the parties.
26  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
22 Simon Price, ‘Comment on ‘The Politics of the Political Business Cycle’’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 28 (1998), 201-10. 
23 James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, ‘Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political 
Budget Cycles in OECD Countries,’ American Journal of Political Science 50 (2006), 530-550.  
24 Douglas A. Hibbs Jr., ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’,  American Political 
Science Review, 71 (1977), 1467-87. 
25 Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal, ‘A Model of the Political Economy of the United States’, 
at pp. 13-14. 
26 Larry M. Bartels finds a pre-election decline in personal income growth in the US when 
Democratic presidents are in office. The analysis of housing markets controls for personal income 
growth and the survey analysis accounts for personal income. Larry M. Bartels, Unequal  
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Perhaps closest to the predictions of the Electoral Investment theory is recent 
work by Alan Gerber and Greg Huber about the impact of mass partisanship on consumer 
behavior.
27 Gerber and Huber find that in the months following an US presidential 
election, a county’s sales tax receipts positively correlate with the county’s support for 
the electoral winner. This effect differs from the Electoral Investment perspective in 
important respects, however. First, Gerber and Huber do not predict a pre-election 
decline. Second, they do not distinguish between irreversible investment and other types 
of purchases. Third, in Gerber and Huber the aggregate change between the pre- and 
post-election periods decreases with electoral competitiveness. By comparison, the 
Electoral Competitiveness Prediction suggests that the change should increase as the race 
becomes tighter.    
In sum, existing theoretical perspectives do not predict any sort of pre-election 
decline in irreversible investment, let alone relate such a decline to electoral 
competitiveness or polarization between the major parties. The following analyses 
subject these new predictions to survey and housing market data.  
Survey Analysis  
We conducted the survey as part of the 2008 CCES, which encompassed a set of 
nationally representative modules purchased by individual universities/groups. Each 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2008). 
27 Alan S. Gerber and Gregory A. Huber, ‘Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan 
Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?’ American Political 
Science Review 103 (2009), 407-426.  
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module included questions written by that group. In addition, all modules contained a 
core content of profile items about the respondent’s background and questions designed 
to be of interest to a range of social scientists. The 2008 CCES consisted of a pre- and 
post-election wave, with 1000 respondents per module in the initial wave.  
In the first wave we asked about the extent to which the electoral outcome would 
affect various aspects of the respondent’s financial situation including his or her job 
security, taxes, and income. The question was worded, “Now I’d like you to consider 
some different factors that may affect your personal financial situation. For each of these 
factors, how much difference do you think it will make who wins the upcoming 
presidential election…A big difference, some difference, only a little difference, or no 
difference at all?” This four-point scale is commonly employed in questions about 
financial matters.
28 The specific factors included “job security,” “the amount of taxes you 
pay,” and “personal income.” In the post-election wave we asked whether the respondent 
had delayed certain purchases and actions until after the election. The precise question 
was, “Please tell me whether you put off any of the following things until you knew the 
results of the November elections…” The possible answers were “yes” or “no.”  
We solicited this information for three related items, only two of which are 
canonical irreversible investments. The investment-related items included “buying or 
                                                            
28 See, for instance, the Gallup poll “Looking ahead, how much of a difference would this tax cut 
(you expected per year) make for you and your family--a big difference, some difference, only a 
little difference, or no difference at all?” Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, February 2001. Retrieved 




selling a home” and “undertaking a home renovation.” The quasi-placebo item was 
“moving.” The purpose of the quasi-placebo item was to ensure that any effects 
uncovered for home transactions or renovations were not due to certain respondents 
having a tendency to delay all actions until after the election. We chose moving because 
the activity is correlated with housing investments yet, given the option of renting, still 
distinct. Research suggests that moving itself is heavily influenced by family events such 
as marriage, divorce, and childbearing.
29  
If the Policy Differences Prediction is correct, we would expect individuals’ 
likelihood of delaying the irreversible investments to correlate with the perceived policy 
differences between the candidates. At the same time, we would not expect these policy 
differences to have a significant effect on the likelihood of moving. To assess whether 
these relationships hold, we conduct a separate probit regression for each combination of 
the pre- and post-election items. The dependent variables, Delay Moving, Delay 
Renovation and Delay Home Purchase/Sale, each equal one if the respondent stated she 
had delayed the activity until learning the election results, and zero otherwise. The key 
independent variables are based on the four-point scale regarding how much difference 
the election would make. Specifically, Job Security Difference equals zero if the 
respondent stated that it made no difference who won the election for her job security, 
one if “only a little difference,” two if “some difference,” and three if “a big difference.” 
Tax Difference and Income Difference are coded similarly. The combination of the pre- 
and post-election items creates nine separate regressions.  
                                                            
29 Alden Speare Jr. and Frances Kobrin Goldscheider, ‘Effects of Marital Status Change on 
Residential Mobility’, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 49 (1987), 455-464.  
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These regressions include demographic and political controls to account for the 
possibility that certain types of individuals were more likely to delay actions until after 
the election independent of how much the outcome affected them. The control variables, 
which are from the CCES core content, account for age, gender, marital status, race, 
political party affiliation, income, homeownership, and number of children under 
eighteen. The coding is based on the CCES categories and described in Appendix Table 
A. We also control for respondents’ confidence about future income using the CCES 
common content question “How would you guess your total family income to be six 
months from now?” The available responses were higher, the same, or lower, which we 
code as an ordinal three-point scale. Including this variable helps ensure that any effects 
of the policy difference variables are not a function of respondents’ general anxiety about 
future income; without this control, the results still support the Policy Differences 
Prediction. Finally, as discussed below, we have also split the sample by certain control 
variables in an effort to ascertain whether the findings are driven by particular types of 
respondents.  
In each regression we analyze all available survey observations. Almost two 
hundred of the pre-election CCES respondents did not participate in the post-election 
wave and even in the pre-election wave, respondents often failed to provide basic profile 
information. Given these constraints, we received a high proportion of responses. For 
each combination of pre- and post- items, the response rate was a minimum of 97 percent 
among those that provided the basic profile information. The number of potential 
respondents was 697 for the Tax Difference question, which was asked of everyone, and 
385 for the Job Security Difference and Income Difference questions, which were asked  
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of all those that reported working full- or part-time according to the profile item on 
employment. Appendix Table A describes this profile item.  
As is standard, the CCES survey weights are used in the analysis of the data.  The 
purpose of survey weights is to minimize any sample-related bias. For instance, if the 
proportion of retirees that participate is lower than expected, then the retirees that 
participated receive a higher weight. The CCES target population is the national US adult 
population, and the CCES employed the 2006 American Community Survey in designing 
the weights. Further details on the weighting are given in the 2008 CCES guide.
30   
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the weighted responses for each of the policy 
difference questions.
31  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Notably, each item produced a different distribution of responses. Only seven percent of 
respondents believed that the election would make no difference with respect to their 
taxes, eleven percent that it would make little difference, thirty-two percent some 
difference, and fifty percent that it would make a big difference. By contrast, twenty-
seven percent of respondents believed the election would have no effect on their job 
security, close to the same percentage that believed the election would have some (31%) 
or a big effect (28%).  For personal income, nineteen percent believed the election would 
                                                            
30 Ansolabehere, ‘Guide to the 2008 Congressional Cooperative Election Study’. 
31 The weighting does not significantly alter the distribution of respondents in each category. The 
largest change is a four percentage point decrease in the percent of individuals who perceive the 
election to make some difference in their income; in all other categories, the weighting causes 
less than a three percentage point shift.  
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have no effect, seventeen percent a little effect, thirty-six percent some effect, and 
twenty-eight percent a big effect.  
  The post-election responses about the likelihood of delay are more stable. 
Fourteen percent of individuals reported that they had delayed purchasing or selling a 
home, sixteen percent had delayed home renovations, and thirteen percent a move.  
Despite this stability, however, the correlation between the items is far from perfect.  For 
instance, the correlation between postponing renovations and moving is r=0.5 and 
between a home sale/purchase and renovations r=0.6. Of the ninety-four respondents 
who professed that they had delayed buying or selling a home until after the election, 
twenty-six percent of them did not delay moving.  
  The critical question is whether such variation relates to the variation in how 
much respondents perceived the election would affect their personal finances. Table 1 
presents the key results for each probit regression. For space reasons, parameter estimates 
for the control variables are provided in Appendix Table B.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The analysis strongly supports the Policy Differences Prediction. As the rows of results 
regarding home transactions and renovations show, the greater is the effect of the election 
on a respondent’s financial circumstances, the more likely she is to postpone these 
irreversible investments until after the election. Moreover, in each case but one this effect 
is significant at p<0.05, two-tailed, and even the exception is significant at p<0.1, two-
tailed. By contrast, the effect of the quasi-placebo item, moving, is never significant by 
any conventional standard.   
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  The magnitudes of the estimates further suggest that the incentive to delay costly-
to-undo investments relates to candidates’ policy differences. Table 2 presents the 
marginal effects for every combination of pre- and post-item.  These effects are 
calculated at each level of policy difference on the four-point scale—i.e., no difference 
(0), only a little difference (1), some difference (2), and a big difference (3)—holding all 
control variables at their means. 
[Table 2 about here] 
For each of the irreversible investments, the marginal effect is larger for higher values of 
the policy difference scale. 
  Consider the first row of results, which concern home transactions and how much 
the electoral outcome affects job security. A shift from perceiving that the election makes 
no difference to a little difference increases the likelihood of delay by three percent, 
while a shift from perceiving some difference to a big difference increases the likelihood 
by five and one-half percent. For renovations, the analogous changes increase the 
probability of delay by three and one-half percent and six and one-half percent, 
respectively. These marginal effects are even more substantial when one considers larger 
changes. For instance, a shift from perceiving a big effect on taxes to perceiving no effect 
reduces the likelihood of delaying a home sale/purchase by fourteen percent (0.047 x 3). 
By comparison, the marginal effects on the quasi-placebo item of moving are 
substantially smaller in magnitude (as well as statistically insignificant).  
The results for the control variables, reported in Appendix Table B, suggest that 
perceived policy differences were not the only factors that influenced respondents’ 
decisions. Blacks were more likely than others to delay home purchases/sales, women  
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less likely than men to postpone moves, and homeowners more likely than others to delay 
renovations. Also, there is some evidence that women were less likely than men to 
postpone home purchases and higher income individuals less likely to delay moves.  
We separately investigated whether the results were driven by certain subgroups of 
the population, including party members and homeowners. Partisans may be more 
emotionally invested in the election, and therefore more likely to delay actions and/or 
believe it will have large policy implications. Party members are defined as those who 
identify as Democrats or Republicans in the coding for the control variable regarding 
party affiliation. If we add to the regressions an interaction term between party 
membership and the perceived policy difference plus a main effect for party membership, 
the coefficient on the interaction term is never significant (p>0.3, two-tailed). If instead 
we run separate regressions for party members and unaffiliated respondents, party 
membership appears to matter in the expected direction for the renovations-job 
regressions, but in the opposite direction for the renovations-tax analysis.
32 Even more 
basic t-tests suggest that the responses do not differ significantly according to party 
membership. Overall, the evidence suggests that support for the Policy Differences 
Prediction does not derive solely from partisans. 
  One could envision that effects would vary according to homeownership. 
Homeowners could be more affected if they are concerned about the possibility of 
                                                            
32 For the renovations-tax policy analysis, the coefficient and standard error were 0.124(0.083) for 
party members and 0.236(0.140) for independents. For the renovations-job security analysis, the 




holding two mortgages, or alternatively, less affected if they are buying and selling 
simultaneously. In nested tests, there is no evidence of a difference between homeowners 
and others; if one adds an interaction term between homeownership and the policy 
difference variable the hypothesized effects are never significantly larger for 
homeowners, with or without interactions between homeownership and the controls. 
However, if instead one splits the sample and runs separate (non-nested) regressions, the 
hypothesized effect of perceived policy differences on irreversible investment is always 
significant with the homeowner sample (p<0.05, two-tailed) and never significant at 
conventional levels with the non-homeowner sample. These results change somewhat if 
we consider non-homeowners with incomes of at least $40,000. The hypothesized effects 
then hold at conventional significance levels (p<0.05, two-tailed) in analyses of tax 
policy differences. The supplemental tests thus suggest that homeowners may be more 
affected than others, although the null results from the nested tests indicate that one 
cannot make strong conclusions about this issue from these data.  
  In sum, the survey analysis provides strong support for the Policy Differences 
Prediction. The larger the impact the individual perceived the election to have on her 
personal financial situation, the more likely she was to delay the irreversible investments 
of homes or renovations until after the election. No such effect occurred for the quasi-
placebo item. While the results are highly supportive of the theory, one could argue that 
the campaign season of 2008 was special in many ways: the housing market was in 
turmoil, this turmoil lead to a collapse of financial markets, and the presidential election 
involved the unexpected rise of Barack Obama. None of these events, of course, implies 
that one would necessarily find the propensity to delay irreversible investments to be  
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correlated with respondents’ perceptions of policy differences between the candidates. 
Moreover, the analysis of the quasi-placebo item suggests that the events did not cause 
respondents who perceived larger policy differences to delay all decisions. Still, we 
recognize that any given election may have qualities that make it uncharacteristic. For 
this reason, we proceed to examine data that involve housing markets across scores of 
elections.  
Housing Market Analysis  
The examination of housing market data is advantageous for several reasons. 
Perhaps most obviously, it offers a straightforward examination of market activity; if 
people are indeed delaying purchases until after an election, then the sales records should 
reveal this pattern. Furthermore, substantial regional variation exists in US housing 
markets,
33 and a variety of policies enacted by US state governments affect individuals’ 
incentives with respect to housing purchases. Accordingly, we can assemble a dataset 
with cross-sectional as well as over-time variation.  
Like the national government, US state governments may influence an individual’s 
taxes and job security. For example, state-level income taxes are as high as eleven 
percent and state governments directly employ almost four million individuals. 
Moreover, these governments enact many laws that explicitly deal with real estate. As 
mentioned previously, states can limit the ability of localities to raise property taxes and 
                                                            
33 E.g., Alan K. Reichert, ‘The Impact of Interest Rates, Income, and Employment upon Regional 
Housing Prices’, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 3 (1990), 373-391.   
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provide property tax relief to groups of homeowners.
34 State governments also influence 
housing markets through policies that attract businesses to particular locations. For 
instance, when a state creates or expands tax-free zones for businesses, then the tax-free 
areas become more desirable.
35 Likewise, state governments offer tax credits to firms to 
encourage them to move to the state, and such relocations affect local housing markets.
36 
More generally, as Michael Ebeid and Jonathan Rodden note, US state governments have 
“wide-ranging control over fiscal and regulatory policy.”
37  
Thus if the Electoral Investment theory is correct, we should observe that 
gubernatorial elections affect state and local housing markets. An advantage of focusing 
on gubernatorial elections is that we can exploit the sub-national variation in these 
                                                            
34 E.g., Albanese, ‘Texas’ Perry Signs School Finance Bill that Cuts Maximum Property Tax 
Rate’; ‘Governor Rendell:  Record 588,638 Pennsylvanians Received Property Tax/Rent 
Rebates’.  
35 Mike Hughlett, ‘Job Zones Unveiled: State Designates 325 Communities Eligible for Business 
Subsidy’, Saint Paul Pioneer Press, 19 December 2003, p. C1.  
36 David Brunori, ‘Principles of Tax and Targeted Tax Incentives’, State & Local Government 
Review, 29 (1997), 50-61.  
37 Michael Ebeid and Jonathan Rodden, “Economic Geography and Economic Voting: Evidence 
from the US States”, British Journal of Political Science, 36 (2006), 527-547, at p. 530. 
Additionally, states can enact education policies that influence home values. See, e.g., Lori L. 
Taylor, ‘Revealed-Preference Measures of School Quality’, in Leanna Stiefel, Amy Ellen 
Schwartz, Ross Rubenstein, and Jeffrey Zabel, eds, Measuring School Performance and 
Efficiency: Implications for Practice and Research, 2005 Yearbook of the American Education 




38 Gubernatorial elections are staggered such that in every year multiple 
states have an election.  The analysis can therefore control for national influences with 
year indicators, and assess whether the states with gubernatorial elections in a given year 
have weaker housing markets than other states. In addition, of course, the tests will 
account for local variation in the economy, demographics, and other factors. 
Two measures of housing market performance are examined. First, Zillow.com 
offers data on home sales, as a percentage of all homes, for thirty-five states from 1999-
2006. These data allow us to analyze seventy-three gubernatorial elections.
39 Second, as a 
supplementary analysis, we make use of the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index 
(CMHPI), which is published by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac) and encompasses over three hundred metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).
40 For 
some MSAs, the index extends back as far as 1975. Due to the more limited time span of 
                                                            
38 By analyzing gubernatorial elections, we do not mean to suggest that local elections are 
necessarily irrelevant. However, Ferreira Fernando and Joseph Gyourko find that partisan 
differences in mayors do not significantly affect policies. Moreover, in the US many local 
elections are nonpartisan.  Finally, the housing data do not correspond to the political boundaries 
for local elections. See Ferreira Fernando and Joseph Gyourko, ‘Do Political Parties Matter? 
Evidence from U.S. Cities’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2009), 399-422. 
39 These states include AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IL, IA, KY, MA, MD, MA, 
MI, MN, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NY, NC, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, VT, VA, WA, WV, and WI.  The 
data for Vermont span only four years.  
40 A metropolitan statistical area is a population center as defined by the US Office of 
Management and Budget. MSAs typically encompass multiple counties and/or towns.  
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some of the control variables, the CMHPI is examined from 1979-2006 for 338 MSAs. 
These data encompass 339 separate gubernatorial elections.  
The measure of sales clearly offers a more direct test of the theoretical 
predictions. However, research on housing markets suggests that new home construction 
is strongly persistent and correspondingly, that supply responds more slowly than 
demand does to external dynamics.
41 If one takes these stylized facts as given, then 
demand should respond more than supply to the political uncertainty engendered by an 
upcoming election. We therefore analyze price data in addition to the sales data, but focus 
on the analysis of sales given that it does not depend on additional stylized facts and 
assumptions. 
For the data on sales, we test the Pre-election Decline and Electoral 
Competitiveness Predictions with the following general specifications, respectively, for 
each state i and year t,  
[1]          %Homes Soldit =  f(Gubernatorial Election Yearit, Sub-National Controlsit, Year 
Indicatorst, i) 
 
[2]   %Homes Soldit =  f(Gubernatorial Election Yearit × Competitiveit, Gubernatorial 
Election Yearit × Not Competitiveit,, Competitiveit, Sub-National 
Controlsit, Year Indicatorst, i), 
 
where i represent state fixed effects. The general specifications for home prices are 
analogous for each MSA m and year t except that some controls are available at the 
                                                            




MSA-level while others only at the state-level. The following descriptions clarify the 
level at which each control is available.   
 
%Homes Sold. Zillow.com calculates the percentage of single-family homes that sold 
within a given state and year out of all single-family homes in that state, whether they 
were explicitly on the market or not. %Homes Sold equals this value, which captures 
turnover in the single-family housing market. Importantly, the measure is based on both 
new construction and “existing” homes. Obtaining an accurate estimate of total home 
sales is important for inter-state comparisons because new homes are a more significant 
portion of some markets than others. Also beneficial is the fact that the Zillow.com data 
are based on actual sales, not pending contracts that may ultimately fall through.  By 
comparison, the US government collects data on sales of new homes versus existing 
homes separately, and the series are not compatible. The series on new homes is not even 
available at the state- or local levels. Moreover, it is based on pending contracts while the 
existing home sales series reflects actual purchases.
42   
 
%Change in Real Home Prices. The Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index (CMHPI) 
is constructed from over thirty million “repeat transactions.” A particular home’s value 
must be observed at least twice in order for that home to contribute to the price index. 
                                                            
42 The government collects data on new home sales as part of the Survey of Construction, while 
the National Association of Realtors provides the data on existing home sales.   
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This feature and the breadth of the data make the CMHPI attractive to scholars.
43  The 
index encompasses not only high profile metropolitan statistical areas such as Boston-
Quincy, Massachusetts but also lower profile areas such as Altoona, Pennsylvania.
44 The 
index is based on conventional, conforming mortgages for single unit residency houses 
purchased or securitized by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
or the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). All data are converted to 
2008 dollars for purposes of analyzing real prices; the results are robust to analyzing 
nominal prices. Due to the substantial variation in price across localities, we follow the 
standard practice of analyzing percentage change rather than the absolute level, although 
the substantive results are robust to using the level.
45  
                                                            
43 E.g., William Stephens, Ying Li, Vassilis Lekkas, Jesse Abraham, Charles Calhoun, and 
Thomas Kimner, ‘Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index’, Journal of Housing Research, 6 
(1995), 389-418.  
44 We have also analyzed the almost identical index published by the Office of Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and the results are similar. We use the CMHPI because it has 
larger coverage for some MSAs.  
45 A working paper by Justin Wolfers argues that home prices reflect voters’ future economic 
expectations.  We considered potential implications of this interpretation of home prices, 
particularly the possibility that the findings could be driven by bad economic conditions that 
cause voters to have weak economic expectations. Accordingly, we examined whether the 
findings held when personal income growth was higher than the median level. The results were 
robust to examining this subsample. For instance, the coefficient and standard error on 
Gubernatorial Election Year are -0.354(0.181) for the fixed effects estimation of Equation [1]. 




Gubernatorial Election Year. This key independent variable equals one if the state has a 
gubernatorial election that year and zero otherwise.   
 
Electoral Competitiveness. We measure electoral competitiveness as a function of the 
winning gubernatorial candidate’s share of the two-party vote.
46  For the data on home 
sales, the median value of this share is fifty-five percent and for prices it is fifty-six 
percent. To minimize collinearity among interaction terms, we categorize races as either 
competitive or uncompetitive. Specifically, Competitive equals one if the winner receives 
less than fifty-five percent of the two-party vote and zero otherwise. Likewise, Not 
Competitive equals one if the winner receives at least fifty-five percent of the vote.  We 
have experimented with alternative cutpoints, and the results are robust to alternatives.
47 
 
Real Income Growth. Various studies suggest that home prices increase in response to 
growth in personal income.
48  To account for this influence, we use the US Bureau of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Business School Typescript, 2007), available at 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/Voterrationality%28latest%29.pdf (accessed 
December 5, 2011).   
46 Generally the two-party vote concerns Democratic and Republican candidates. However, the 
percentage is based on the two candidates with the largest vote shares even in the unusual case 
where one of them is a third-party candidate.  
47 For instance, if we increase the cutpoint to six or seven percentage points, all of the major 
results hold.  
48 E.g., Karl E. Case and Robert J. Shiller, ‘Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?’, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 2003 (2003), 299-342; James M. Poterba, ‘House Price Dynamics:  
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Economic Analysis personal income data. These data are available at the state- and MSA-
levels, and each test uses the level consistent with that of the dependent variable (states 
for home sales and MSAs for home prices). In each case, the variable equals the annual 
percentage change in real income.
49  
 
Change in Unemployment. Some research suggests that increases in unemployment may 
harm housing markets.
50 Using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, we control 
for this possibility. Because unemployment data are available by state for the entire time 
period while by MSA only since 1990, all analyses employ the annual percentage change 
in state-level unemployment.  
 
Demographic Demand. The tests control for the impact of demographic change with 
Census Bureau data on population. For most MSAs, population data are not available on 
an annual basis and therefore all analyses employ state-level data. Mankiw and Weil 
recommend weights for each age group to account for the fact that demand for housing is 




The Role of Tax Policy and Demography’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1991 (1991), 
143-203.  
49 Using the absolute level of real income rather than the percentage change does not alter the 
main findings but does reduce the effect of income on housing market performance.  
50 E.g., Case and Shiller, ‘Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?’. 
51 Gregory N. Mankiw and David N. Weil, ‘The Baby Boom, the Baby Bust, and the Housing 
Market’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 19 (1989), 235-58.  
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Lagged Foreclosure Rate. The National Delinquency Survey published by the Mortgage 
Bankers Association records the percentage of loans in foreclosure for each state and year 
beginning in 1979. In many states, banks must give the previous owners of the foreclosed 
home a redemption period of up to a year before selling the property. We therefore 
control for the foreclosure rate of year t-1 when analyzing housing market performance in 
year t. As the media recognizes, at times foreclosures constitute a substantial proportion 
of sales. For instance, a 2009 Wall Street Journal piece reported that “existing-home 
sales jumped 5.1%...driven by foreclosure sales that are sending prices plunging.”
52 Thus 
we should expect foreclosures to increase home sales. However, as the quote attests, 
foreclosures reduce prices. We accordingly expect a negative relationship between 
foreclosures and prices.  
 
Year Indicators. A set of year indicators accounts for national-level factors such as 
mortgage/interest rates and the national economy. These indicators ensure that any effects 
associated with gubernatorial elections are not an artifact of certain states happening to 
hold elections in particular years.  
 
A consistent finding in the real estate literature is short-term persistence in 
housing market performance.
53 The most straightforward way to handle short-term 
persistence is to include lagged dependent variables. While the inclusion of lags will 
                                                            
52 Kelly E. Grace, ‘US Foreclosures Jumped in March’, Wall Street Journal Online, 15 April 
2009.  
53 Some research argues that this persistence results from social contagion. See Robert Shiller,  
Irrational Exuberance, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).  
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cause the coefficients to estimate short-term effects, this is consistent with the fact that 
the hypothesized effects are limited to the pre-election period.  A more problematic issue 
is the potential for so-called Nickell-bias, which refers to the bias and inconsistency 
generated by estimating panel data with fixed effects and a set of lagged dependent 
variables.
54 While the inconsistency disappears as the number of time periods increases, 
the home sales data do not encompass a particularly large number of time periods.   
A standard practice in such situations is to estimate a range of models, including 
not only the basic fixed effects and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators but also 
difference- and system-generalized methods of moments (GMM). The latter two 
estimators are designed for the analysis of short, wide panel data sets when both fixed 
effects and lagged dependent variables are desired. Difference-GMM, which is also 
known as the Arellano-Bond estimator, eliminates the fixed effects by first-differencing 
the original equation. Then to account for any endogeneity of the first-differenced lagged 
dependent variables, they are instrumented with their own past levels, lagged two or more 
periods (as well as the first-differenced exogenous variables).
55 The system-GMM 
estimator, which was developed by Arellano and Olympia Bover and by Richard 
Blundell and Bond, builds on difference-GMM by additionally estimating the original 
equation in levels, with the additional equation instrumented by lagged first-differences 
                                                            
54 Stephen Nickell, ‘Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects’, Econometrica, 49 (1981), 
1417-26.  
55 Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, ‘Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 




of the endogenous variables.
56 Because the system-GMM estimator is associated with 
more instruments, the potential for overidentification is higher than with difference-
GMM.
57 As a part of the analysis, we will assess the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions. One concern with difference-GMM is that it is relatively inefficient, and 
assuming that specification tests support the use of system-GMM, it is superior to 
difference-GMM on the grounds of efficiency and finite sample bias. 
Across the various specifications, analysis of the home sales data suggests that the 
first and second lags of the dependent variable have significant effects while additional 
lags do not; we accordingly estimate models that include two lags. We begin by 
presenting the results from OLS with standard errors clustered by state (and excluding the 
fixed effects), fixed effects with robust standard errors, and difference-GMM with robust 
standard errors. The difference-GMM results are from one-step estimation and the 
instruments for the endogenous variables include the second through fifth lags of 
%Homes Sold. Also, specification testing suggests that the economic controls for income 
and unemployment are predetermined. Consistent with difference-GMM procedures for 
predetermined variables, they are instrumented with their first lags.
58 If income and 
                                                            
56 Manuel Arellano and Olympia Bover, ‘Another Look at the Instrumental Variables Estimation 
of Error Components Models’, Journal of Econometrics, 68 (1995), 29-51; Richard Blundell and 
Stephen Bond, ‘Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models’, 
Journal of Econometrics, 87 (1998), 115-143. 
57 David Roodman, ‘A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments’, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 71 (2009), 135-158.  
58 If the income and unemployment variables are considered exogenous, then the Difference-in-
Hansen test for the exogenous instruments suggests that one can reject at p=0.03 the null that they  
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unemployment are considered exogenous, the substantive results are identical but 
specification tests suggest that the model is overidentified; Appendix Table C shows 
these details.  
Table 3 presents the main findings. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Columns [1], [2], and [3] concern the Pre-election Decline Prediction and Columns [4], 
[5], and [6] the Electoral Competitiveness Prediction. The estimates in the first three 
columns suggest that the average effect of a gubernatorial election is to depress home 
sales significantly in the pre-election period. In all of the specifications, the coefficient on 
Gubernatorial Election Year is negative and significant at p<0.05, two-tailed.   
The magnitude of the effect is remarkably similar across the different estimators.  
In each case, the percentage of homes sold (out of all homes in the area, regardless of 
whether they are explicitly on the market) drops between two and three-tenths of a 
percentage point. This impact is comparable to that from a standard deviation decrease in 
per capita income growth, which is 2.471 percentage points; such a change also produces 
a decline of two to three-tenths of a percentage point in the percentage of homes sold  
(e.g., in Column [1], 0.106 × 2.471 = 0.262). Thus the size of the electoral effect is 
similar to that of other, well-established influences on housing markets.  
Columns [4] through [6] indicate that this impact is driven by competitive 
elections. The coefficients on Competitive × Gubernatorial Election Year suggest that the 
percentage of homes sold, out of all homes in the state, drops between a third and a half 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
are exogenous.  Once income and unemployment are considered predetermined, the p-value for 
this test increases to p=0.76.  
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of a percentage point when the race is competitive. By comparison, the estimates on Not 
Competitive × Gubernatorial Election Year suggest a decline of one-tenth of a 
percentage point when one candidate leads by more than five percentage points of the 
vote. In addition, the estimates for the competitive elections are significant at p<0.05, 
two-tailed, while those for the uncompetitive elections are not significant. 
In each of the difference-GMM analyses in Table 3, the Hansen J-statistic 
indicates that the model is not overidentified. David Roodman argues that p-values below 
or even as great as 0.25 “should be viewed with concern” while ones equal to 1.00 are a 
“classic sign” that instrument proliferation has vitiated the capacity of the test to detect an 
overidentified model.
59 Neither Hansen J-statistic in Table 3 suggests cause for concern. 
Also, the tests for serial correlation support the models. First-order serial correlation is 
expected in difference-GMM because the first-differencing creates first-order serial 
correlation even when the errors in the original equation are independently and 
identically distributed. Second-order serial correlation should not be present, however, 
and as Table 3 shows, there is no evidence of it. We have also analyzed models that 
restrict the instruments for the endogenous (lagged dependent) variables to the second 
through fourth lags and, separately, the third through fifth lags. In each case, specification 




59 Roodman, ‘A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments’, p. 142 and p. 151.  
60 The coefficients are similar in magnitude to those from those difference-GMM in Table 3, and 




Appendix Table C indicates that the substantive findings are supported by system-
GMM although specification tests reject these models. In Columns [3] and [4], which 
show the results from system-GMM applied to the same instrument structure adopted for 
difference-GMM, the Hansen J-Statistics and Difference-in-Hansen tests suggest an 
overidentified model. Columns [5] and [6] report results from assuming the economic 
controls are exogenous. While overidentification is not a problem in these models, the 
exogeneity of the economic controls is rejected at p=0.025 for the specification of 
Column [5] and p=0.096 for that of Column [6]. We additionally analyzed a battery of 
system-GMM models that reduced the instrument count yet considered the economic 
controls predetermined; the results of these alternative models were similar to those in 
Columns [3] and [4] in that the substantive results held but the Hansen tests suggested the 
models were overidentified.
61  
Across all of the models in Appendix Table C and Table 3, the results for the 
control variables present few surprises. Home sales increase with real income. Also, they 
are positively associated with foreclosures; after a property forecloses, banks tend to sell 
it (at substantially reduced prices). The estimates for unemployment and demographics 
are not statistically significant. The literature on housing markets has generally focused 
on home prices rather than sales, and it may be that these factors affect the former but not 




61 We tried reducing the lag structure so that it included only the second or the third lag, and even 
collapsed this lag, but the Hansen tests still suggested that the models were overidentifed.   
62 E.g., Poterba, ‘House Price Dynamics: The Role of Tax Policy and Demography’.   
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In sum, the analysis of home sales provides substantial support for the Pre-
election Decline and Electoral Competitiveness Predictions. Even accounting for a 
variety of economic and other determinants of housing markets, housing market activity 
is associated with a pre-election decline. Moreover, this overall effect appears to be 
driven by the competitive elections.   
Table 4 shows that these results extend to home prices. As with the analysis of 
home sales, we begin by focusing on the results from the OLS, fixed effects, and 
difference-GMM models. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Columns [1], [2], and [3] estimate the average impact of a gubernatorial election, and in 
all models the coefficient on Gubernatorial Election Year is significant (p<0.05, two-
tailed). In the year before an election, average home prices decline. Moreover, the size of 
the impact is relatively consistent across the disparate specifications. In each, prices fall 
by approximately a third of a percentage point in that year.   
As with the home sales data, this effect appears to be driven largely by the 
competitive elections. Columns [4], [5], and [6] suggest that when the candidates are 
within five percentage points of each other, home prices drop nine-tenths of a percentage 
point (p<0.05, two-tailed). By comparison, when the election is uncompetitive, there is 
not a substantial drop in home prices. The coefficient on Gubernatorial Election Year × 
Not Competitive is even positive in some of the specifications, although in these cases it 





The results for the other coefficients in Table 4 largely agree with expectations. 
Across all of the models, higher home prices are associated with increases in real income 
and decreases in unemployment. Also, in the OLS and fixed effects specifications, the 
effects of foreclosures and demographic demand are in the expected direction and 
statistically significant. In the GMM models, these two control variables are not in the 
expected direction but the effects are not at all significant.   
The price data involve a substantially longer time series than the home sales data, 
and thus for the difference-GMM models a more restrictive instrument set is required to 
avoid overidentification. The instruments for the endogenous variables include the third 
through fifth lags, and these instruments are collapsed as described by Thorsten Beck and 
Ross Levine and by Roodman.
63 Specification testing suggests that the economic controls 
are not predetermined in these models and therefore the variables are considered 
exogenous; however, if instead they are considered predetermined and the instruments 
include the first lag collapsed, the key coefficients remain significant at conventional 
levels, the magnitudes of these coefficients are similar, and the Hansen J-statistics 
suggest that the models are not overidentified. The results are also robust to alternative 
sets of instruments for the lagged dependent variables, including the collapsed third and 
                                                            
63 Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine, ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence’, Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 28 (3), 423–42; Roodman, ‘A Note on the Theme of Too Many 
Instruments’. If we reduce the number of lags used as instruments but do not collapse them, the 
models are still overidentified.  
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fourth lags or the collapsed second through fourth lags.
64 Finally, we assessed the 
appropriateness of system-GMM with the home price data.  Under any specification 
attempted, including ones that severely restricted the number of instruments, the 
substantive results held yet the Hansen tests suggested the models were overidentified.
65 
In sum, the findings on home prices corroborate those on home sales. With each 
data set, the Pre-Election Decline and Electoral Competitiveness Predictions receive 
support. On average the pre-election period is associated with a decline in home sales and 
prices. Furthermore, when the effects are analyzed separately for competitive versus 
uncompetitive elections, it becomes clear that the average effect is driven by the 
competitive races. The housing market analysis thus provides substantial support for the 
Electoral Investment theory.  
Conclusion 
  This paper has argued that sectors of irreversible investments experience a pre-
election decline due to the policy uncertainty generated by elections. Moreover, because 
policy uncertainty is associated with the competitiveness of the race and the policy 
differences between candidates/parties, the pre-election decline depends on these factors. 
The paper has conducted a variety of tests of the predictions, including analyses of 
individual-level survey data and aggregate housing market data. The results have 
provided substantial support for the predictions.  
                                                            
64 The results on the key coefficients are also robust to increasing the number of lags used as 
instruments, but the Hansen tests recommend against these models.  
65 For instance, if the only instrument is the collapsed second or third lag, then the Hansen J-
statistic and Difference-in-Hansen test suggest the model is overidentified.   
 
39
  Additionally, the findings offer a possible reason that studies of opportunistic 
political business cycles have generally uncovered little evidence that economic growth 
within OECD countries follows such cycles.
66 In particular, this paper suggests that 
sectors of irreversible investment experience a decline at precisely the time that 
opportunistic theories predict governments are simulating short-term expansions. 
Accordingly, future research might investigate whether theories of opportunistic cycles 
receive greater support if irreversible investment is removed from output. 
  The findings also provoke other suggestions for future research. Most naturally, 
studies might examine whether the patterns observed in this paper extend to business 
investment or consumer durables such as automobiles. Separately, future work should 
analyze whether the relationship among irreversible investment, elections, and 
uncertainty extends to countries other than the United States. The endogenous nature of 
                                                            
66 For a discussion of the lack of evidence for opportunistic cycles in economic growth in OECD 
countries, see Franzese, ‘Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes’. 
Although cf. for the United States as an exception: Stephen E. Haynes and Joe A. Stone, ‘Political 
Parties and the Variable Duration of Business Cycles’, Southern Economic Journal, 60 (1994), 
869-85; George A. Krause, ‘Electoral Incentives, Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Post-War US Personal Income Growth’, British Journal 
of Political Science, 35 (2005), 77-101. The opportunistic model also receives support in analyses 
of developing countries. See, e.g., Lawrence Sáez and Aseema Sinha, ‘Political Cycles, Political 
Institutions, and Public Expenditure in India, 1980-2000’, British Journal of Political Science, 40 
(2009),  91-113; Daniel Treisman and Vladimir Gimpelson, ‘Political Business Cycles and 




elections in many nations would necessitate additional theorizing about the precise 
relationship between the timing of elections and economic performance, but the 

























































Notes: Probit coefficients given above standard errors. Controls include age, gender, race, marital 
status, party affiliation, income, number of children under eighteen, homeownership, and future 
income confidence. Results for the control variables are detailed in Appendix Table B. Parameter 
estimates in bold are significant at p<0.1, two-tailed, and estimates in bold italics are significant 
















































































Notes: Marginal effects given above standard errors. Estimates in bold are significant at p<0.1, 







































































































































Year Indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
N  206 206 171 206 206  171
AR(1) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.014 ‐‐ ‐‐  0.018
AR(2) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.369 ‐‐ ‐‐  0.301
Hansen J Test (p‐value) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.601 ‐‐ ‐‐  0.637
R
2  0.92 0.81 ‐‐ 0.92 0.83 ‐ ‐
Notes: Coefficients given above standard errors. Dependent variable equals %Homes Sold. In difference-
GMM, the instruments for the lagged dependent variables include their second through fifth lags and the 
instruments for the predetermined economic controls include their first lags. All analyses conducted with 
STATA, which differences out the constant term in difference-GMM estimation. Estimates in bold 







































































































































Year Indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
N  7265 7265 6923 7265  7265  6923
AR(1)  ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.056 ‐‐ ‐‐  0.055
AR(2)  ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.173 ‐‐ ‐‐  0.177
Hansen J Test (p‐value)  ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.898 ‐‐ ‐‐  0.899
R
2  0.64 0.59 ‐‐ 0.64 0.58 ‐ ‐
Notes: Coefficients given above standard errors. Dependent variable equals %Change in Real Home 
Prices. In difference-GMM, the instruments for the lagged dependent variables include the third through 
fifth lags, collapsed. All analyses conducted with STATA, which differences out the constant term in 
difference-GMM estimation. Estimates in bold significant at p<0.1, two-tailed, and estimate in bold italics 





























Notes: Probit coefficients given above standard errors. Estimates in bold are significant at p<0.1, two-
tailed, and estimates in bold italics are significant at p<0.05, two-tailed.  Table 1 presents results for the 
variables that test the Policy Differences Prediction.  
  







[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]    [7]  [8]  [9] 
Year of Birth  0.004  0.003  0.008  0.010  0.005  0.013 
 
0.002  0.006  0.001 
   (0.079)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.010) (0.007)  (0.010)   (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Female ‐ 0.299  ‐0.309  ‐0.255 ‐ 0.203  ‐0.265  ‐0.176    ‐0.481 ‐ 0.373 ‐ 0.492 
   (0.007)  (0.152)  (0.203)  (0.216) (0.152)  (0.209)    (0.200)  (0.157)  (0.207) 
Married ‐ 0.128  0.148 ‐ 0.104 ‐ 0.071  0.119 ‐ 0.057    ‐0.076  0.225 ‐ 0.077 
   (0.216)  (0.168)  (0.218)  (0.211) (0.163)  (0.217)   (0.212)  (0.176)  (0.210) 
Black  0.755  0.676  0.764  0.462  0.481  0.478 
 
0.326  0.356  0.371 
   (0.340)  (0.258)  (0.338)  (0.368) (0.269)  (0.366)   (0.309)  (0.266)  (0.304) 
Party   ‐0.202  0.072 ‐ 0.163 ‐ 0.020  0.280  0.018 
 
‐0.032  0.190 ‐ 0.077 
   Affiliation  (0.235)  (0.169)  (0.234)  (0.227) (0.158)  (0.224)    (0.260)  (0.188)  (0.263) 
Income ‐ 0.185  0.012 ‐ 0.010  0.022  0.015  0.029 
 
‐0.057  ‐0.018  ‐0.058 
   (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.031) (0.023)  (0.032)    (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.031) 
Homeownership  0.254 ‐ 0.046  0.261  0.589  0.329  0.590 
 
0.194 ‐ 0.200  0.164 
(0.229)  (0.183)  (0.233)  (0.257) (0.194)  (0.256)    (0.248)  (0.195)  (0.247) 
Children under ‐ 0.015 ‐ 0.095 ‐ 0.008 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.073  0.003 
 
0.029 ‐ 0.060  0.031 
   18                     (0.058)  (0.082)  (0.056)  (0.060) (0.080)  (0.059)   (0.048)  (0.073)  (0.047) 
Future Income  0.085  0.158  0.114  0.229  0.215  0.269    ‐0.137  0.060 ‐ 0.152 
Confidence          (0.175)  (0.123)  (0.177)  (0.168) (0.115)  (0.172)   (0.164)  (0.121)  (0.164) 





(14.601)  (10.646)  (15.289) (19.502) (13.113)  (19.573)   (15.329)  (11.988) (14.910) 







































































































































Year Indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
N  171  171  206  206  206  206 
AR(1)  0.024  0.031  0.014  0.003  0.002  0.002 
AR(2)  0.396  0.327  0.369  0.409  0.469  0.456 
Hansen J Test (p‐value)  0.165  0.167  0.982  1.000  0.524  0.615 




Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N 
Notes: Coefficients given above standard errors. Columns [1] and [2] alter the difference-GMM model of 
Table 3 by assuming unemployment and income are exogenous. Columns [3] and [4] apply system-GMM 
to the difference-GMM model of Table 3, and Columns [5] and [6] adjust this model by assuming 
unemployment and income are exogenous. Estimates in bold are significant at p<0.1, two-tailed, and 
estimates in bold italics are significant at p<0.05, two-tailed.   
 